Right of Employee to Sue Employer for Intentional Tort by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 26 | Issue 2 Article 9
Winter 1951
Right of Employee to Sue Employer for Intentional
Tort
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1951) "Right of Employee to Sue Employer for Intentional Tort," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 26 : Iss. 2 , Article 9.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol26/iss2/9
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
would be to :tax their,.proceeds -as ordinary income in all cases under a
"spreading" method similar to that. now existing in:§ 107(b) of the Code.29
But instead of requiring 80%. to be received in one year, -a lesser percentage
should be the measure, based on the time consumed in developing the in-
vention." This -solution would tend to reduce the unnecessary tax benefit
accorded inventors over other taxpayers engaged in selling personal services.3,
RIGHT OF EMPLOYEE TO SUE'EMPLOYER FOR AN
INTENTIONAL TORT
Workmen's compensation laws propose to make some of the consequences
of industrial accidents and.conditions a part of the cost of production to be
borne by industry and eventual1y.by society. Thus, the acts vitiate the common
law defenses to an action for negligence, which had forced the burden of in-
dustrial mishaps on the individual employees, and assure workers of definite
and speedy payments if incapacitated during the course of their employment.
In return, the employer's liability is limited to a portion of the wage loss and
medical expenses, against which he may insure. To further the policy in-
volved, the machinery of the acts is uniformly made the exclusive remedy."
A recent case, Bevis v. Arnco Steel Corporation,2 presented the issue of
income derived from filing and final fees and from the annual taxes would be approxi-
mately the same as the income realized under the present system. But this, it has been
contended, would result in the successful and more profitable patents paying more of the
country's overall tax burden. Frederico, Taxation and Survival of Patents, 19 J. PAT.
OFF. SOc'Y 671 .(1937) ; Brodahl, Taxation of the Patent Right, 17 GEO. WAsH. L. REV.
482, 483 (1949).
29. INT. REV. CODE § 107(b).
30. Since it is seldom that eighty per cent will be received in one year, the percentage
should be based on the length of time necessitated to develop the patent. The following
are rough estimates of more equitable required percentages:
Length of Development Per Cent Received in One Year
Three years ........................................ 43% %
Four years ......................................... 35 %
Five years ......................................... 30 %
Six Years ......................................... 26%%
To change § 107(b) without a corresponding change in § 107(a) might partially appease
those who contend that the tax law should favor inventors.
31. Taxation of royalties at capital rates evidences one more instance of the absurd
manner in which a perhaps once valid tax favor has been bestowed. See Miller, The
Capital Asset Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation, 59 YALE L.J. 837, 1057
(1950). The classical theory of capital rates was to tax income accruing over a long
period but received in an aggregate at rates roughly correlated to those which would have
applied had the income been taxed in the year it was realized. But receipts of royalties
are usually spread over years.
1. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COIPENSATION LAWs 2-10
(1944); 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 1 (2d ed. 1932); Honnold,
Theory of Workmen's Compensation, 3 CORNELL L. Q. 264 (1918).
2. 86 Ohio App. 525, 93 N.E.2d 33 (1949), aff'd neme., 153 Ohio St. 366, 91 N.E.2d
479, cert. denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 74 (1950). The appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court and the
petition for certiorari to the U. S. Supreme Court were based on constitutional grounds.
.... . NOTES
whether an exclusive remedy clause prevents' a common law ction where
the employer has committed an intentional tort.
In the Bevis case the employer's physicians had induced the employte to
continue working by purposely concealing the fact that he had contracted sili-
cosis and by representing that their examinations disclosed no evidence of this
disease. Becoming permanently and totally disabled, the employee accepted
compensation and later brought an action for deceit. A demurrer to the com-
plaint was sustained, and affirmed on appeal, on the ground that the sole
remedy was under the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act.3
Although exclusive remedy clauses are usually worded broadly, 4 most
jurisdictions in which the question has arisen have held that a suit for an
intentional tort is not barred.' The common law action of assault, for example,
has been sustained on the ground that the injury was hot "accidental" and
therefore not covered by the acts.6 Concomitantly, where employees have
3. OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 1465-37 et seq. (1946).
4. These clauses differ but are similar in purpose. The Indiana statute is illustrative,
providing that: "The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee subject to this
act on account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and
remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or next of kin, at
common law or otherwise, on account of' such injury or death." IND. STAT. ANN.
§40-1206 (Burns, 1933). The Ohio statute seems to go farther than most as it bars
a common law action against an employer whether the injury, disease, or condition
is compensible or not. OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 1465-70_ (1946). See Note, 5 OHIo
ST. L.J. 436 (1939). Despite the generality of these clauses, they have frequently
been construed not to preclude a common law action when to do so would prevent any
recovery, or would be contrary to the purposes of the acts. For example, employees have
been allowed to recover from their employers for injuries and diseases not compensible
under the acts, HOROVITZ, op. cit. supra note 1, at 321, and third persons from whom an
employee has recovered may obtain indemnity from the employer when the latter was
primarily at fault in causing the injury. American District Telegraph Co. v. Kittleson,
179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950).
5. Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., 230 S.W. 2d 28 (Ark. 1950) ; Boek v.
Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930); Lavin v. Goldberg Bldg. Materials
Corp., 274 App. Div. 690, 87 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Third Dep't 1949) ; Richardson v. The Fair,
Inc., 124 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1939) ; Stewart v. McLellan's Store Co., 194
S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940) ; HOROVITZ, op. cit. supra note 1, at 336; Note, 2 ARK. L. REv.
130 (1948). Contra: McLaughlin v. Thompson, Boland, & Lee, 72 Ga. App. 564, 34
S.E.2d 562 (1945).
6. Le Pochat v. Pendleton,. 187 Misc. 296, 63 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd
mee., 271 App. Div. 124, 68 N.Y.S.2d 594 (First Dep't 1947) ; DeCoigne v. Ludlum Steel
Corp., 251 App.. Div. 662, 297 N.Y. Supp. 636 (Third Dep't 1937) ; Boek v. Wong Hing,
supra note 5. Since the compensation acts replaced the action for negligence as a remedy
against employers, the courts might be more reluctant to allow a common law action for
physical injuries resulting from reliance on misrepresentations, the usual remedy in such
cases being an action for negligence. Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence,
or Warranty, 41 HARV. L. REv. 733, 734 (1929). However, damages for personal in-
juries are recoverable in an action for deceit. Flaherty v. Till, 119 Minn. 191, 137 N.W.
815 (1912) ; Hoar v. Rasmussen, 229 Wis. 509, 282 N.W. 652 (1938) ; PROSSER, TORTS
703 (1941). Moreover, whether an action for deceit will lie or not, there is no doubt that
an intentional tort was committed in the Bevis case for which an action should lie what-
ever its name. PROSSER, TORTS 5 (1941) ; Smith, Torts Without Particular Names, 69
U. oF PA. L. REv. 91 (1921). Certainly, an intentional misrepresentation which results in
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chosen to seek compensation rather than pursue a common law action, recovery
has been allowed by rationalizing that from the employee's point of view the
assault was "accidental," since unexpected.7  This is a nice verbalistic dis-
tinction between what is or is not accidental but is of little utility other than
as a means to justify a desired result."
The underlying basis for permitting the common law action is that it is not
the purpose of the compensation acts to allow employers to insure against
their intentional wrongs, thereby escaping civil liability, while relegating their
unfortunate victims to the partial and meager relief of workmen's compensa-
tion.' The common law forbids intentional tort liability insurance'0 and there
is nothing to indicate a reversal of this policy. None of the statutes expressly
providing for instances of willful misconduct by employers limits the employee
to the compensation given for other industrial injuries." Intentional wrongs
are generally regarded as more reprehensible than those resulting from care-
lessness. 2 And exemplary as well as compensatory damages may be re-
covered, as a punishmerft and deterrent, for an intentional tort, but not for
negligence.3 Further, one of the secondary purposes of the compensation
acts is to make it advantageous for employers to improve safety conditions and
permanent disability is at least as reprehensible as an assault and battery, especially where
the employer profited from his wrong by securing the continued services of a valued
employee.
7. Pawnee Ice Cream Co. v. Yates, 164 Okla. 48, 22 P.2d 347 (1933). Contra:
Rumbulo v. Erb, 19 N.J. Misc. 311, 20 A.2d 54 (Ct. of C.P. 1941). The holding of the
Pawnee case has been accepted by most jurisdictions in other types of workmen's com-
pensation cases, especially in the last few y!ears. Pearson v. Rogers Galvanizing Co., 115
Ind. App. 426, 59 N.E.2d 364 (1945) (employee injured by defective machinery) ; Duncan
v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946) (worker electrocuted due to gross
negligence of employer) ; Comm. of Taxation & Finance v. Bronx Hospital, 276 App. Div.
708, 97 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Third Dep't 1950) ; Horovitz, Modern Trends in Workmen's Com-
pensation, 21 IND. L.J. 473, 491 (1946). Employees have obtained compensation for in-
juries caused in the course of their employment by the assaults of employers, supervisory
employees, fellow workers, and even by outsiders on the grounds that such assaults were
"accidental." See, generally, Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws, 41 ILL. L. REv. 311 (1946).
8. "So far as such injury relates to the injured employee it is, as to his right to accept
compensation, accidental. So far as the assaulting employee or employer is concerned, the
act is deliberate and intentional and not accidental. This is a rational basis on which an
employee may make an election either to claim compensation or to sue at common law."
Mazzaredo v. Levine, 274 App. Div. 122, 80 N.Y.S.2d 237, 243 (First Dep't 1948) (con-
curring opinion).
9. See Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., 230 S.W.2d 23 (Ark. 1950) ; Lavin
v. Goldberg Bldg. Materials Corp., 274 App. Div. 690, 87 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Third Dep't 1949) ;
Richardson v. The Fair, Inc., 124 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1939); HoRovlTz, IN-
JURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 336 (1944).
10. VANCE, INSURANCE 64 (2d ed. 1930) ; Woodford, Insurance Against the Conse-
quences of Wilful Acts, (1948) INS. L. J. 867, 874.
11. See notes 18, 19 and 23 infra.
12. PROSSER, TORTS 39 (1941).
13. 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 477, 487 (1906) ; McClelland, Ex-
emplary Damages in Indiana, 10 IND. L.J. 275 (1935).
NOTES
reduce injuries in their businesses. 14 To remove the deterrent effect of puni-
tive damages and to substantially circumscribe the actual damages recover-
able for willful injuries can hardly be considered an inducement to this end,
especially as the employer may, under the acts, insure against such limited
liability. And finally, to so restrict the employee to workmen's compensa-
tion would be of no substantial benefit to one for whose benefit the statutes
were enacted, since the common law defenses which made recovery from
employers so difficult in an action for negligence were never applicable in the
case of an intentional tort. 5 For these reasons the interpretation placed
upon the exclusive remedy clause in the Bevis case appears to be unsound.
Yet, in the Bevis case compensation was accepted under the act.' 6 And
it has been held that, although the exclusive remedy clause be considered
inapplicable to intentional wrongs, the employee nevertheless must elect
between accepting compensation and pursuing his common law action.' 7 But
there is no compelling reason why the employee should be required to make
an election,' 8 and a mandatory choice between the two remedies can impose
hardship. Many workers do not have sufficient resources to carry them
through a period of disablement and to bear the costs of a legal proceeding.
The very ones who need a full redress most would have no practical alternative
to the acceptance of workmen's compensation. A few acts meet this objection
14. Bohlen, The Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L. REv. 328,
333 (1912).
15. Contributory negligence is not a defense to intentional torts. PRoSsFR, TORTS 402
(1941). The fellow servant rule would not apply to a tort committed by an employer
himself, nor, in those states which adopted the vice-principal rule, where it was com-
mitted by a superior employee. Gibbons, Who Is a Vice-Prinipal with Respect to the
Law of Master and Servant, 13 VA. L.J. 725 (1889). Of course, a servant would not
assume the risk of an intentional tort. See Thompson, Under What Circumstances a Ser-
vant Accepts the Risk of His Employment, 31 Am. L. Rv. 82 (1897).
16. See State ex rel. Bevis v. Coffinberry, 151 Ohio St. 293, 85 N.E.2d 519 (1949).
Bevis was awarded $260 as compensation for his silicotic condition, and brought this
earlier action to have the award increased.
17. Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., 230 S.W.2d 28 (Ark. 1950) ; Boek v.
Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930) ; DeCoigne v. Ludlum Steel Co., 251
App. Div. 662, 297 N.Y. Supp. 636 (Third Dep't 1937) ; Note, 2 Ark. L. Rev. 130 (1948).
But see Le Pochat v. Pendelton, 187 Misc. 296, 63 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd
nem., 271 App. Div. 124, 68 N.Y.S.2d 594 (First Dep't 1947). The acceptance of com-
pensation does not constitute a binding election if the employee's application for compen-
sation was fraudulently induced by his employer. Johnsen v. American-Hawaiian S.S.
Co., 98 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1938) ; Pisanello v. Polinori, 60 Ohio App. 422, 22 N.E.2d 92
(1938). In some jurisdictions, the employee may also rescind his acceptance of compen-
sation if he was ignorant of his right to elect at the time. Behrendt, The Rationale of the
Election of Remedies Under Workmen's Compensation Acts, 12 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 231,
250 (1945) ; Smith v. Price Bros. Co., 131 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Johnsen v. American-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., supra. Contra: Talge Mahogany Co. v. Burrows, 191 Ind. 167, 130
N.E. 865 (1921).
18. A few statutes specifically provide for an election of remedies by an employee
disabled by his employer's intentional wrong. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 56-946 .(1939) ; Ky.
REV. STAT. § 342.015 (2) (1946); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws ART. 101, § 44 (Cum. Supp.
1947); UTAH CODE ANN. § 42-1-57 (1943).
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by affording compensation increased a fixed percentage over what it would
ordinarily be for the injury sufferdd, when it was due to an employer's
willful'or wanton misconduct. 9  This has the advantage of reducing litiga-
tion and the consequent expenses, awarding a more adequate compensation,
and penalizing employers for their intentional wrongs. Btit the employee's
recovery would still be l~aed primarily on the wage loss suffered and would
not necessarily bear any close "relationship to his actual damages.2"
A more equitable solfitlon is "s'uggested by those cases involving an em-
ployee who has been tortiotisly'iijured by a third party. Many state compen-
sation acts have third pdrty clauses1 which" allow the employee both to accept
compensation and to sue- the third party, with the employer or in'surer sub-
rogated to part of the cause of action against the tortfeasor to the extent of
compensation paid, plus costs.2 No reason suggests itself for denying a
19. CAL. LABOR CODE 9 4553 (Cum. Supp. 1949) (50% increase with a $3750 maxi-
mum) ;-ANN. LAWS OF MASS. C. 152, § 28 (1943) (100% increase). The employee cannot
bring a common law action in these states. Buttner v. American Bell Tel. Co., 41 Cal.
App.2d 581, 107 P.2d 439 (1940) ; Sarber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 434 (9th Cir
1928). In California, the employer cannot insure against this additional liability. CAL. INS.
CODE § 11661 (1944)." The Ohio Constitution, Art. II, § 35, provides that if the injury or
death of the employee results from the employer's violation of a lawful order or require-
ment, then the award is to be increased between 15 and 50 per cent. See Lacher v. Roxanna
Petroleum Corp., 40 Ohio App. 444, 179 N.E. 202 (1931).
20. It was estimated, in 1946, that the injured worker, on the average, received work-
men's compensation to cover only 40% of his wage loss. Horovitz, Assaults and Horse-
play Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 41 ILL. L. REV. 311, 313 n. 5 (1946). As
most of the acts are relatively inflexible, providing a maximum on the amount of com-
pensation, it is probable that this percentage is even smaller today, considering the in-
crease in the wage level since 1946. Hence, even if the compensation were doubled, as is
done by the most liberal of the acts which allow increased payments, it would probably
fall short of full satisfaction of even the wage loss suffered by the injured employee.
21. Three states have no third party provisions in their acts. Their courts allow the
employee both to receive compensation and to sue the third party, retaining the full
amount recovered. George v. Youngstown, 139 Ohio St. 591, 41 N.E.2d 567 (1942);
Holland v. Morley Button Co., 83 N.H. 482, 145 Atl. 142 (1929); Mercer v. Ott, 78 W.
Va. 629, 89 S.E. 952 (1916). The workmen's compensation is said to be in the nature of
occupational insurance, Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co. v. Schahovsky, 111 Ohio St. 791,
146 N.E. 306 (1924), or a pension, Mercer v. Ott, supra, and therefore a full common law
recovery is permissible. This is against the public policy of the other states as a double
recovery and an undue burden on their industrial insurance funds. See Behrendt, supra
note 17, at 240; Hardman, The Common Law Right of Subrogation Under Workmen's
Compensation Acts, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 183 (1920). This policy would be even stronger in
the employer's intentional tort cases since the employer would also be subject to a double
liability.
22. ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 81, § 1304 (1947) ; CAL. LABOR CODE § 3853 (1943) ; CONN.
REV. GEN. STAT. § 7425 (1949) ; GA. CODE § 114-403 (1933) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 143, § 44
(Cum. Supp. 1949); IND. STAT. ANN. § 40-1213 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1949); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 85.22 (1950); Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.055 (1946); LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4397
(1939); MINN. STAT. § 176.06 (Henderson 1945) ; Miss. GEN. LAWS c. 354, § 30 (1948) ;
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 92-204 (1947) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-118 (1943); NEV. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. § 2687 (1929) ; N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:15-40 (1937) ; N.Y. WORKMEN'S COms-
PENSATION LAW § 29; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 671,1419 (Cum. Supp. 1949) ; R.I. GEr.
LAWS c. 300, § 20 (1938); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6965 (Williams Cum. Supp. 1949); Wis.
STAT. § 102.29 (1947). Most of the other statutes provide that the employee must elect
NOTES
similar recourse to the employee intentionally harmed by his employer. If the
employer were self insured, the compensation paid, plus costs, could be
applied in mitigation of damages. Against an insured employer, the insurer
could be subrogated to part of the employee's cause of action.3 Those states
which have comparable third party clauses 24 could achieve this result by apply-
ing them, either by analogy, or directly on the ground that the employer-
employee relationship was severed by the action of the employer, who would
then be in the position of a third party.22 However, a statutory enactment
would probably be necessary in some instances. 26
If this recommended procedure were applied to the Bevis case the em-
ployee could obtain both the speedy relief afforded by the compensation
act and full monetary satisfaction for all damages, punitive as well as actual.
The employer could not limit or insure against liability for his intentional
torts, yet would not suffer a double loss. Such an outcome would be more
in harmony with the liberal purposes of the compensation acts.
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE AND WAIVER OF FEDERAL VENUE
UNDER "NEIRBO"
Venue relates to the place of trial.' Parties to litigation enjoy it as a
personal privilege, hence they may waive that privilege and consent to a
different situs for trial.2 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., held
between compensation and a common law procedure. If he chooses to accept compensa-
tion, the employer alone may proceed against the third party with any excess recovery over
the compensation paid, plus costs, going to the employee. For a classification and discus-
sion of the third party clauses, see Behrendt, supra note 17, at 231; Note, 7 MONTANA L.
REV. 89 (1946).
23. The Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia acts expressly permit an employee
who has been injured by his employer's willful and wanton misconduct to accept compen-
sation and sue the employer for any excess damages. ORE. Comp'. LAws ANN. § 102-1753
(1940); WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7680 (1932); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2527 (1943). In
Texas, dependents of an employee who has died due to the intentional misconduct or
gross negligence of his employer may sue at common law for exemplary damages. TEX.
STAT., REV. Civ., ART. 8306, § 3 (1948).
24. See note 22 supra.
25. See Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 471, 231 N.W. 233, 234 (1930).
26. It has been contended that in the third party cases the employer or insurer could
be subrogated against the third party by analogy to the indemnity principle that subroga-
tion takes place where one party has been subjected to liability for the fault of another.
See Behrendt, supra note 17, at 240; Hardman, supra note 21, at 183. If this were applied
to the employer's intentional tort cases, a double recovery by the employee could be pre-
vented without resorting to statutory provisions, even though he were allowed both
compensation and a common law action.
1. General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., 260 U.S. 264 (1922); Lee v. Chesa-
peake & 0. Ry., 260 U.S. 653 (1922).
2. 28 U.S.C. 1406(b) (1948). Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177,
179 (1928) ; Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 363 (1925) ;
Grover Tank & Manf. Corp. v. New England Terminal Co., 125 F.2d 71 (1st Cir.
1942). "The privilege accorded may be lost by failure to assert it seasonably, by formal
